Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

9-2020

Est. of Curtis v. S. Las Vegas Med. Inv’rs, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 39
(July 9, 2020)
Allison Mann

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs

Recommended Citation
Mann, Allison, "Est. of Curtis v. S. Las Vegas Med. Inv’rs, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (July 9, 2020)" (2020).
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 1338.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1338

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Est. of Curtis v. S. Las Vegas Med. Inv’rs, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 39 (July 9, 2020)1
TORT LAW: NEGLIGENCE, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE, COMMON KNOWLEDGE
EXCEPTION TO MEDICAL EXPERT AFFIDAVIT REQUIREMENT
Summary
The Court applied the common knowledge exception to the expert affidavit requirement
for an ordinary negligence claim that appeared to sound in professional negligence. The Court
determined that a claim predicated upon ordinary negligence—such that a lay juror would not
require medical expert testimony to evaluate—is excused from NRS 41A.071’s medical expert
affidavit requirement.2 Here, an act such as administering medicine to the wrong patient is ordinary
negligence rather than professional negligence.
The Court affirmed the expert testimony requirement for allegations that challenged the
health care provider’s medical judgment. Here, allegations of failing to monitor a patient sounded
in professional negligence and required expert testimony to evaluate. Therefore, this allegation
was not excused from the medical expert affidavit requirement.
Background
Nurse Dawson, a licensed nurse working for Life Care Center of South Las Vegas (“LCC”)
accidentally administered morphine, prescribed to another patient, to decedent, Ms. Curtis. At the
direction of a physician, Nurse Dawson administered Narcan to Curtis to counteract the morphine.
LCC monitored Curtis until 5pm that day. Curtis was found unresponsive at 11am the next day.
Curtis passed away three days later due to morphine intoxication.
Curtis’s Estate (“The Estate”) sued LCC alleging that its mismanagement caused Nurse
Dawson to administer the wrong medication and fail to monitor or treat Curtis, leading to Curtis’s
death.
The district court granted LCC’s motion for summary judgment finding the gravamen of
the allegations sounded in professional negligence and required an expert affidavit to be filed along
with the complaint per NRS 41A.071.3
Discussion
In Nevada, professional negligence is the failure of a health care provider, such as a nurse,
to use reasonable care, skill, or knowledge used by like professionals in similar situations on the
job.4 The court is required to dismiss a claim without a supporting medical affidavit for
professional negligence against a health care provider.5 The purpose of the requirement is for
economic efficiency and to reduce suits lacking merit or a competent, good faith basis.
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Direct liability claims against a nursing home facility do not excuse compliance with NRS
41A.071’s affidavit requirement
The Estate argued a supporting medical expert affidavit was not required for their particular
allegations because the Estate alleged only ordinary negligence claims against LCC. The Estate
argued LCC’s managerial decisions were the direct cause of Curtis’s death, and not professional
negligence on the part of Nurse Dawson.
The Court disagreed with the Estate’s arguments. The Court stated that where the facts of
an ordinary negligent hiring, supervision, or training claim are necessarily linked to professional
negligence, then that ordinary negligence claim should be categorized as vicarious liability and
not a separate tort. The Court emphasized ordinary negligence claims shall not be used to evade
the supporting medical affidavit requirements of professional negligence claims when such claims
clearly sound in professional negligence.
The Estate’s claims were necessarily connected to the underlying professional negligence
and was therefore required to accompany the claim with a supporting medical affidavit.
Whether the allegations in the complaint sound in ordinary negligence or professional
negligence
A claim sounds in professional negligence if it involves “medical diagnosis, judgment, or
treatment.”6 If a jury requires a medical expert to explain the appropriate standards of care to
evaluate a claim, then the claim is one of professional negligence. However, if jurors are able to
use common knowledge to evaluate the nonmedical services provided by a healthcare worker, then
the claim is likely ordinary negligence.
The Court recognized the common knowledge exception’s narrow applicability to
professional negligence claims not involving professional judgment. The common knowledge
exception applies in situations where negligence is obvious to a lay juror without expert testimony.
Such a claim will not be subject to Nevada’s expert affidavit requirement.
The Estate’s complaint against LCC was based on two underlying allegations: (1) Nurse
Dawson administered the wrong medication to Curtis and (2) LCC did not thereafter appropriately
monitor or care for Curtis. The Court concluded that the first allegation sounded in ordinary
negligence while the latter was professional negligence.
Nurse Dawson administering morphine to Curtis is a matter of ordinary negligence
The threshold issue was whether Nurse Dawson’s negligence in administering the wrong
medication to Curtis constituted professional negligence and therefore triggered the expert
affidavit requirement. The Court concluded Nurse Dawson was not required to use her professional
judgment when she administered the wrong medication.
Even though administering medicine constituted medical treatment, the prescribing
physician was the one who used professional judgment to ascertain what medication Curtis
required. The claim that Nurse Dawson administered the wrong medication to Curtis required no
expert testimony to evaluate and was therefore ordinary negligence.
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The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Estate’s ordinary negligence claim
based upon the Nurse’s administration of the wrong medication to Curtis because the Court found
this claim was not subject to the expert affidavit requirement.
LCC’s failure to monitor Curtis is a matter of professional negligence
Another issue was whether the allegation that the facility failed to monitor Curtis was a
professional negligence allegation. The Court concluded that it was.
The allegations could not be evaluated by a lay juror based merely on common knowledge.
The allegations of failure to properly monitor Curtis entailed decisions requiring professional
judgment. Here, expert testimony was vital to aid the jurors in evaluating the decision to prescribe
Narcan, LCC’s decision not to transfer Curtis to the hospital, and the decision of how and when to
monitor Curtis after the accidental morphine administration.
Because the allegations were a matter of professional negligence, the Court affirmed
summary judgment by the district court concerning the failure-to-monitor allegation.
Res ipsa loquitur does not relieve the Estate of its duty to file an expert affidavit
The Estate’s alternative argument claimed their allegations fell within the res ipsa loquitur
exception to the expert affidavit requirement. The res ipsa loquitur exception at issue applies
where, during treatment, a part of the body not involved in the treatment was injured.7
The Estate’s claim however did not fit within the exception because Curtis did not suffer
injury to a distinct part of the body not addressed in the treatment. Here, the treatment in and of
itself was the injury. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.
Conclusion
Accidental administration of medicine to the wrong patient was ordinary negligence,
readily apparent to a lay juror without expert testimony. Under the common knowledge exception,
readily apparent, ordinary negligence claims were not subject to a medical expert affidavit
requirement. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this allegation
and the Court reversed in part.
A medical affidavit was required under NRS 41A.071 where allegations challenge a health
care provider’s professional judgment. The district court correctly granted summary judgment as
to the professional negligence allegation and the Court affirmed in part. The matter was remanded
to the district court for further proceedings.
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